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We investigate the asymptotic security of one-way continuous variable quantum key distribution against
Gaussian two-mode coherent attacks. The one-way protocol is implemented by arranging the channel uses in
two-mode blocks. By applying symmetric random permutations over these blocks, the security analysis is in fact
reduced to study two-mode coherent attacks and, in particular, Gaussian ones, due to the extremality of Gaussian
states. We explicitly show that the use of two-mode Gaussian correlations by an eavesdropper leads to asymptotic
secret key rates which are strictly larger than the rate obtained under standard single-mode Gaussian attacks.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.95.052310
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum technologies are becoming reality, with huge
efforts being devoted to developing scalable quantum com-
puters and robust quantum communications, e.g., for building
a future quantum internet [1–5] . In this global scenario,
quantum key distribution (QKD) [6–8] is certainly one of
the most advanced areas, with intense research activities
directed towards practical implementations. QKD represents
a set of strategies that, integrating both quantum and classical
communication, allow two authorized remote users (Alice and
Bob) to generate a random sequence of bits; this is then used
as an encryption key in a one-time pad protocol [9], therefore
providing an unconditionally secure (information-theoretic
[10]) private communication between the remote users.
The effectiveness of QKD relies on the ground rule of
encoding classical information in nonorthogonal quantum
states [11], that are then transmitted through a noisy quantum
channel controlled by the eavesdropper (Eve). This is also
equivalent to sending the “nonorthogonal part” of discordant
quantum states [12]. In this way, Eve’s attack is bounded by
fundamental laws of quantum physics [13]: any information
gained by Eve creates loss and noise on the quantum channel.
Thanks to this trade-off, Alice and Bob can accurately
quantify the amount of classical error correction and privacy
amplification needed to reduce Eve’s stolen information to a
negligible amount [6].
Since the first proposals to implement quantum infor-
mation and computational tasks, continuous variable (CV)
systems have attracted increasing attention [14,15]. The fact
of using quantum systems with continuous spectra (infinite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces) has several advantages with
respect to the traditional approach based on discrete variables
(qubits). In particular, one can implement QKD at high rates
by using highly modulated coherent states and homodyne
detections, not only in one-way schemes [16–21], but also
in two-way protocols [22–26] and CV strategies based on
measurement-device independence (MDI) [27–30].
Ideal implementations of CV-QKD provide the highest
key rates, not so far from the ultimate repeaterless bound
*carlo.ottaviani@york.ac.uk
recently established in Ref. [31] . For a lossy channel with
transmissivity τ , the maximum rate achievable by any QKD
protocol (secret-key capacity) is equal to [31]K = − log2(1−
τ ), with a fundamental rate-loss scaling of τ/ ln 2 ≃ 1.44τ bits
per channel use for long distances, i.e., at high loss τ ≃ 0. The
most practical one-way CV-QKD protocols, i.e., the switching
[16] and no-switching [17] protocols, can potentially reach an
asymptotic long-distance rate of τ/ ln 4 bits per use, which is
half the secret key capacity. Similar performance occurs for
CV-MDI-QKD in the most asymmetric configuration [32].
In this work we deepen the study of the secret key rates
of the most known one-way CV-QKD protocols [16,17]. In
particular, we explicitly study their security in the presence of
Gaussian two-mode attacks, representing the residual eaves-
dropping strategy after the de Finetti symmetrization [33,34]
over two-mode blocks. Under these attacks, we derive the
analytical expressions of the asymptotic key rates [35]. With
these in hand, we show that eavesdropping strategies based
on correlated ancillas turn out to be strictly less effective than
Gaussian attacks based on uncorrelated ancillas (single-mode
attacks). In other words, any two-mode Gaussian attack with
strictly nonzero correlations improves Alice and Bob’s key
rate.
II. PROTOCOL AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Let us consider the communication scheme of Fig. 1(a).
Alice sends to BobN ≫ 1 coherent states |αk〉. The amplitudes
αk , for k = 1, . . . ,N , are independently and identically modu-
lated by a bivariate zero mean Gaussian distribution of variance
μ. The communication channel is under Eve’s control, and the
output detections provide Bob with classical outcomes βk .
After N uses of the channel, the parties share two correlated
random sequences of symbols given by the sets {αk} and {βk}.
For the sake of clarity, we consider reverse reconciliation
(RR), so that the key is obtained by Alice inferring Bob’s
variables. Now, when Bob applies homodyne detections,
randomly switching between measurements on quadrature qˆk
and pˆk , we have the switching protocol [16]. By contrast, when
Bob measures both quadratures (heterodyne detection), we
have the no-switching protocol [17]. Here we discuss the latter
case, while we leave the analysis of the switching protocol in
Appendix B.
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FIG. 1. Reduction to Gaussian two-mode attacks. (a) Alice
Gaussianly modulates N coherent states |αk〉 in an independent and
identical fashion. These are sent through a quantum channel (Eve) and
received by Bob, whose measurements provide the classical variables
βk for k = 1, . . . ,N . Eve’s general eavesdropping is based on a global
unitary operation, U , applied to the N instances of the one-way
communication. (b) After random permutations, the coherence of the
general attack is confined within each two-mode block. (c) Within
an arbitrary block, we show a Gaussian two-mode attack against
the protocol (in EB representation). A realistic Gaussian attack is
simulated by two beam splitters, with transmissivity τ , mixing Alice’s
signals, A and A′, with Eve’s ancillary modes, e and E, belonging
to a larger set of modes {e,E,E′′} in her hands. The reduced state
of modes e and E is Gaussian with thermal noise ω and correlation
matrix G as in Eq. (4).
In a general attack, Eve applies a global unitary operation
U , which coherently processes her ancillary modes with all the
N signals exchanged by the parties, with the ancillary outputs
stored in a quantum memory. One has that the Bob-Eve joint
system is described by a quantum state in the following form:
ρ = U
(
N⊗
k=1
|αk〉〈αk| ⊗ |〉Eve〈|
)
U †, (1)
where |〉Eve is Eve’s total input state. The security analysis
considering this general scenario is not a practically solvable
problem but, in the limit of N →∞, it has been proved
[33,34] that one can get rid of the cross correlations between
different uses of the channel. More specifically, with no loss of
generality, the security analysis can be simplified by applying
symmetric random permutations on the input ({αk}) and output
({βk}) classical data sets.
Note that Alice and Bob may arrange the signals into two-
mode blocks cj , with j = 1, . . . ,N/2. Then, they can apply
random permutations over the blocks cj rather than over the
single uses of the channel. After such a symmetrization, the
quantum state given in Eq. (1) can be rewritten as the following
tensor product:
ρ ≃
M⊗
j=1
ρblock, (2)
whereM = N/2 is large. After this symmetrization, the initial
global coherence of quantum state of Eq. (1) is reduced to that
one enclosed within each two-mode state ρblock, associated
with the arbitrary block cj , as also depicted in Fig. 1(b). Thus
the only effective coherence to consider is two mode and this
scenario can be further simplified using the extremality of
Gaussian states [36].
In other words, the previous assumptions allow us to
reduce the general eavesdropping strategy to a Gaussian
two-mode attack within each block. In particular, we may
consider the most realistic form of such an attack, where
Eve exploits two beam splitters to combine Alice’s signals
with correlated ancillas prepared in an arbitrary Gaussian
state. See Fig. 1(c). Note that this is a reduction which is
often considered in practice. The security analysis of one-way
CV-QKD protocols under collective (single-mode) Gaussian
attacks [37] is typically restricted to the most practical case of
entangling-cloner attacks, resulting in thermal-loss channels
between Alice and Bob. The optimal key rate achievable over
this channel has been recently upper bounded in Ref. [31] and
lower bounded in Ref. [38].
III. ENTANGLEMENT-BASED REPRESENTATION
AND GAUSSIAN TWO-MODE ATTACKS
The security analysis is performed in the entanglement
based (EB) representation [15,39], as also shown in Fig. 1(c).
Alice owns a source of two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV)
states. These are zero-mean Gaussian states with covariance
matrix (CM) of the form
VEPR =
(
μI
√
μ2 − 1Z√
μ2 − 1Z μI
)
, (3)
where μ  1, I = diag(1,1) and Z = diag(1,−1). In each
block, Alice’s input state is Gaussian of the form ρaA ⊗ ρa′A′
and CM VEPR ⊕ VEPR . The signal coherent states |α〉 and
|α′〉 are remotely projected on modes, A and A′, by applying
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heterodyne detections on local modes a and a′. In this way,
Alice modulates the amplitudes α and α′ according to a
zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance μ− 1 (which
is typically large).
As previously mentioned, we assume a realistic Gaussian
two-mode attack where Eve employs two identical beam
splitters with transmissivity τ . These are used to mix Alice’s
input modes, A and A′, with Eve’s ancillary modes, e and E,
respectively. The latter belong to a larger set of ancillary states
{e,E,E′′} owned by the eavesdropper. The reduced Gaussian
state σeE is completely determined by the following CM [40]:
VeE =
(
ωI G
G ωI
)
, for G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
, (4)
whereω = 2n¯+ 1 quantifies Eve’s thermal noise, with n¯mean
number of thermal photons. The correlations between modes
e and E are described by the parameters g and g′ in the matrix
G. Their values are bounded by the constraints
|g| < ω, |g′| < ω, ω|g + g′|  ω2 + gg′ − 1, (5)
which are imposed by the the uncertainty principle [27,40].
Note that from the CM of Eq. (4), one can recover the standard
collective attack scenario (single-mode attack) for g = g′ = 0.
In the ideal case of perfect RR efficiency, the key rate (bit
per channel use) is defined as
R = IAB − IE
2
, (6)
where IAB is the mutual information between variables {α,β}
and {α′,β ′} and IE is Eve’s accessible information on Bob’s
variables (factor 2 accounts for the double use of the channel
within each block). For many uses of the channel N ≫ 1, IE
is bounded by the Holevo information
χ = SE − SE|ββ ′ = SAB − SA|ββ ′ . (7)
Here SE is the entropy of Eve’s output state, ρEve = ρe′E′ , and
is then equal to the entropy SAB of Alice and Bob’s joint state
ρAB = ρaa′BB ′ (because the global state of Alice, Bob, and
Eve is pure). Then, SE|ββ ′ is the entropy of Eve’s state ρe′E′|ββ ′
conditioned on Bob variables β and β ′; because these are
the outcomes of a rank-1 measurement, we have that Alice’s
conditional state ρA|ββ ′ has entropy SA|ββ ′ = SE|ββ ′ .
Note that, for Gaussian states, the von Neumann entropy
S(.) can be computed via the formula
S :=∑xh(x), (8)
where x are symplectic eigenvalues [15] and
h(x) := x + 1
2
log2
x + 1
2
− x − 1
2
log2
x − 1
2
. (9)
By replacing IE in Eq. (6) with the Holevo function of Eq. (7),
one obtains the following ideal key rate (in RR):
R := IAB − χ
2
. (10)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Mutual information
As a consequence of the two-mode reduction strategy, Alice
and Bob’s mutual information is given by
IAB = I + I ′, (11)
where I := I (α,β) is the contribution from the first channel
use, and I ′ := I (α′,β ′) from the second use. Each contribution
is given by the following expression:
I = log2
VB + 1
VB|α + 1
,
I ′ = log2
VB + 1
VB|α′ + 1
, (12)
where VB = τμ+ (1− τ )ω describes the quadrature variance
of the average thermal state arriving at Bob’s side, while
VB|α = VB|α′ = τ + (1− τ )ω is the quadrature variance of
Bob’s state after Alice’s heterodyne detection. Using these
relations in Eqs. (11) and (12), and working in the limit of
μ≫ 1, one easily obtains
IAB = 2 log2
τμ
1+ τ + (1− τ )ω . (13)
We note that, as one would expect, this expression does not
depend on the correlation parameters g and g′.
B. Holevo bound
We now describe the general steps to obtain the Holevo
bound χ (more details are in Appendix A). Working in the EB
representation, Alice and Bob’s joint state ρaa′BB ′ is described
by the following CM:
V =
⎛
⎜⎝
(μ+ 1)I Z
(μ+ 1)I Z
Z 
I (1− τ )G
Z (1− τ )G 
I
⎞
⎟⎠,
(14)
where we have set

 := τ (μ+ 1)+ (1− τ )ω, (15)
 :=
√
τ [(μ+ 1)2 − 1]. (16)
The symplectic spectrum is obtained from the ordinary
eigenvalues of matrix |iV| [15] with
 =
4⊕
j
ωj , ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (17)
In the limit of large μ, and after some simple algebra, we
find the following symplectic eigenvalues:
ν+ =
√
(ω + g)(ω + g′), (18)
ν− =
√
(ω − g)(ω − g′), (19)
ν1 = ν2 = (1− τ )μ. (20)
052310-3
OTTAVIANI, MANCINI, AND PIRANDOLA PHYSICAL REVIEW A 95, 052310 (2017)
Using these eigenvalues and the expansion
h(x) ≃ log2
e
2
x +O(x−1), (21)
we find the following expression for Alice and Bob’s von
Neumann entropy:
SAB = h(ν+)+ h(ν−)+ 2 log2
e
2
(1− τ )μ. (22)
The next step is to apply two sequential heterodyne
detections on modes B and B ′, to obtain the conditional
CM VC describing the conditional quantum state ρaa′|ββ ′ . The
corresponding CM has a complicated expression that can be
found in Eq. (A11) of Appendix A. Computing its symplectic
eigenvalues in the limit of μ≫ 1, we find the following
conditional spectrum:
{ν¯+,ν¯−} =
{√
λ+λ′+
τ
,
√
λ−λ′−
τ
}
, (23)
where we have defined
λ± := 1+ (1− τ )(ω ± g), (24)
λ′± := 1+ (1− τ )(ω ± g′). (25)
The conditional entropy just reads
SA|ββ ′ = h(ν¯+)+ h(ν¯−). (26)
Finally, using Eqs. (22) and (26) in Eq. (7), we can write Eve’s
Holevo bound as
χ = 2 log2
e
2
(1− τ )μ+
∑
i=±
[h(νi)− h(ν¯i)]. (27)
It is easy to check that Eq. (27) recovers the expression of the
Holevo bound of standard collective (single-mode) Gaussian
attacks for g = g′ = 0.
C. Secret-key rate and its analysis
It is easy to compute the secret-key rate using Eqs. (13) and
(27) in Eq. (10). After some algebra, we obtain the following
expression for the rate of the no-switching protocol under
realistic Gaussian two-mode attacks:
R = log2
2
e
τ
(1− τ )[1+ τ + (1− τ )ω]
+ 1
2
∑
i=±
[h(ν¯i)− h(νi)]. (28)
In order to prove that Gaussian two-mode attacks with nonzero
correlations are strictly less effective than single-mode attacks,
we study the derivatives of this rate. We find the following strict
inequality:
R(τ,ω,g,g′) > R(τ,ω,0,0), ∀g,g′ = 0. (29)
The details of the proof are in Appendix A, while here we
limit the discussion to the general ideas. To show Eq. (29),
we first seek for critical points of the function R(τ,ω,g,g′).
Solving the equation ∇R = 0 on the (g,g′) plane, one finds
that only the origin P0 := (0,0) is critical. To determine the
nature of P0, we then compute the second-order derivatives
with respect to the correlation parameters g and g′. This allows
us to compute the expression of the Hessian matrixH and study
FIG. 2. We analyze the key rate of Eq. (28) over the plane of the
correlation parameters, g and g′. Any two-mode attack corresponds
to a point in the colored surface. Boundary attacks, verifying the
condition ω|g + g′| = ω2 + gg′ − 1, are represented by the blue
points. The rate of the single-mode attack g = g′ = 0 is the red spot.
Here we fix τ ≃ 0.44 and ω = 1.2. For these values, the single-mode
attack provides zero key rate. On the other hand, we see that the key
rate is positive for any two-mode attack with nonzero correlations.
its positive definiteness. We therefore find that P0 corresponds
to the absolute minimum of the rate in Eq. (28) within the
domain defined by Eq. (5).
Finally we check that the attacks over the boundary, given
by the condition ω|g + g′| = ω2 + gg′ − 1, also provide key
rates which are strictly larger than that under the single-mode
attack. In Fig. 2 we show a numerical example, which is
obtained by fixing the transmissivity τ ≃ 0.44, the thermal
noise ω = 1.2, and plotting the rate as a function of g and
g′. We see that the secret-key rate under single-mode attack
(red dot) is always strictly less than that of the rate which is
obtained by any physically permitted two-mode attack (which
is a point in the colored surface). The key rates for the attacks
on the boundary of this region are the blue dots. The origin
P0 is therefore always an absolute minimum for R. As a
consequence, any correlation injected into the channels by the
eavesdropper to implement the coherent attack automatically
increases the key rate.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have explicitly studied the security of one-
way CV-QKD protocols against Gaussian two-mode attacks.
The approach is based on an attack-reduction strategy where
the parties pack the uses of the quantum channel in two-mode
blocks. Then, they apply random permutations over these
blocks. This allows them to get rid of any cross correlation
engineered by the eavesdropper between different blocks. We
solved this problem analytically, and we obtained the secret-
key rates under Gaussian two-mode attacks, in particular,
those more realistic and based on a suitable combination of
entangling cloners.
We have then showed that any nonzero correlation used
by the eavesdropper leads to a strictly higher key rate than
the rate obtained under Gaussian single-mode attacks. This is
achieved under the condition that infinite signals are exchanged
(asymptotic rate), therefore not considering composable or
finite-size analyses [41]. We conjecture that the use of
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correlations is not effective even when the size of the blocks
is greater than two modes. It would be interesting to check if
this is still true if Alice adopted correlated encoding between
different uses of the channel [42].
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APPENDIX A: COMPUTATIONS FOR THE
NO-SWITCHING PROTOCOL
Here we provide the calculations to prove Eq. (29) for the
no-switching protocol.
1. Total covariance matrix
Let X = (qˆX,pˆX) be the vectorial quadrature operator
describing a general mode X. The impact of the attenuation
and noise on Alice’s modes, A and A′, through two identical
beam splitters of transmissivity τ are given by the following
expressions:
B = √τA+
√
1− τe, (A1)
B′ = √τA′ +
√
1− τE, (A2)
where e and E are the vectorial quadrature operators describing
Eve’s ancillary modes, e and E, mixed at the beam splitters
with modes A and A′, respectively. Eve’s reduced state σeE is
zero-mean Gaussian with CM as in Eq. (4), with local thermal
noise ω and correlation parameters G := diag(g,g′) fulfilling
the constraints of Eq. (5). We order Alice and Bob’s output
modes as follows: a,a′,B,B ′; then, we use Eqs. (A1) and (A2)
to compute the CM describing Alice and Bob’s total state
ρaa′BB ′ . It is simple to derive the following expression:
V =
⎛
⎜⎝
(μ+ 1)I Z
(μ+ 1)I Z
Z 
I (1− τ )G
Z (1− τ )G 
I
⎞
⎟⎠,
(A3)
where μ− 1 is the classical Gaussian modulation, while 

and  are defined in Eqs. (15) and (16).
2. Alice and Bob’s mutual information
In the no-switching protocol, Bob performs heterodyne
detections measuring both quadratures qˆ and pˆ. From the
form of the attack, we have that the variances in qˆ and pˆ,
relative to both Bob’s modes B and B ′, are identical and given
by VB = 
, with 
 specified in Eq. (15). The conditional
variances, after Alice’s heterodyne detections, are given by
VB|α,α′ = τ + (1− τ )ω. (A4)
Accounting for the double use of the channel within the block,
we derive the mutual information
IAB = 2 log2
VB + 1
VB|α,α′ + 1
. (A5)
Taking the limit of large modulation (μ≫ 1), one gets the
asymptotic expression of the mutual information, given in
Eq. (13) of the main text; i.e.,
IAB = 2 log2
τ (μ+ 1)+ (1− τ )ω + 1
1+ τ + (1− τ )ω
μ→∞→ 2 log2
τμ
1+ τ + (1− τ )ω . (A6)
3. Computation of the Holevo bound
The EB representation and dilation of the two-mode chan-
nel allows us to describe the joint Alice-Bob-Eve output state
as pure. Noting that this quantum state is always processed by
rank-1 measurements, one has that the purity is also preserved
on the conditional state after detection. The eavesdropper is
assumed to control the quantum memory storing her ancillary
modes; she is computationally unbounded, but the parties
exchange an infinite number of signals, N ≫ 1. In this regime
Eve’s accessible information IE on Bob’s variables is bounded
by the Holevo quantity χ . It can be obtained from the von
Neumann entropy of the Alice-Bob total state S(ρaa′BB ′), and
the conditional von Neumann entropy S(ρaa′|ββ ′). The Holevo
bound is then given by
χ = S(ρaa′BB ′ )− S(ρaa′|ββ ′). (A7)
We need to derive the function χ in terms of the relevant
parameters of the protocol τ, ω, g, and g′. We then compute
the symplectic spectrum of the total CM given by Eq. (A3),
from the absolute value of the eigenvalues of the matrix M =
iV, where  = ⊕4k=1ω is the 8× 8 (four modes) symplectic
form [15]. For large μ, one obtains the following expressions:
ν+ =
√
(ω + g)(ω + g′), (A8)
ν− =
√
(ω − g)(ω − g′), (A9)
ν1 = ν2 = (1− τ )μ, (A10)
which, together with Eq. (8) and Eq. (21), are used to calculate
the total von Neumann entropy S(ρaa′BB ′ ) = SAB given in
Eq. (22).
Now, the conditional CM VC , providing the conditional von
Neumann entropy, is obtained via heterodyning Bob’s modes
B and B ′. We apply the formula for heterodyne detection [43]
to the total CM V. After some algebra, VC can be written in
the following form:
VC =
1
(
+ 1)2 − g2(1− τ )2
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
k ˜k
k′ ˜k′
˜k k
˜k′ k′
⎞
⎟⎟⎠, (A11)
with the matrix entries defined as
k := (μ+ 1)[g2(1− τ )2 + (
+ 1) ˜
]+ (
+ 1)τ, (A12)
˜k := −g(1− τ )τμ(μ+ 2), (A13)
˜
 := 
− τ, (A14)
k′ = (μ+ 1)[g′2(1− τ 2)+ (
+ 1) ˜
]+ (
+ 1)τ, (A15)
˜k′ = −g′(1− τ )τμ(μ+ 2). (A16)
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For large μ, the symplectic spectrum of the conditional CM
VC is given by Eq. (23). Note that this spectrum does not
depend on the modulation μ, and for g = g′ = 0 we recover
the conditional eigenvalues of Ref. [17].
Now, from Eq. (23), we derive the conditional von Neumann
entropy S(ρaa′|ββ ′) = SA|ββ ′ , given in Eq. (26). Combining the
computed entropies, we obtain the Holevo bound in Eq. (27).
Finally, including the mutual information of Eq. (A6), we
derive the asymptotic key rate
RBlock = log2
4
e2
τ 2
(1− τ )2[1+ τ + (1− τ )ω]2
+
∑
k=±
[h(ν¯k)− h(νk)]. (A17)
More precisely, for channel use, we find
R = RBlock
2
, (A18)
as given in Eq. (28).
4. Study of the critical point
From the first-order derivatives ∂gR and ∂g′R, and solving
the equation ∇R = 0, one finds a single critical point P0 for
any τ and ω; this is given by the origin (g = g′ = 0) of the
correlation plane (g, g′), bounded by the constraints given by
Eq. (5). We then take the second-order derivative ∂2R, with
respect to g and g′, and build the (symmetric) Hessian matrix
H =
(
∂2gR ∂
2
gg′R
∂2g′gR ∂
2
g′R
)
. (A19)
From the positive definiteness of this matrix, evaluated in the
critical point P0, one has that P0 is an absolute minimum. We
then study the sign, in P0, of the determinant of the Hessian
matrix (A19).
After some algebra one can write it in the simplified form
detH = D1 −D2
τ [¯λ+ τ ]¯λω(ω2 − 1) , (A20)
where we have defined
f (x) := 1
log2 e
log2
1+ x
1− x (> 0 for 0 < x < 1), (A21)
D1 := τ
[
f (ω−1)+ 2 log2
¯λ+ τ
(1− τ )√ω2 − 1
]
, (A22)
D2 := ω
[
f (τ ¯λ−1)+ τ 2 log2
¯λ+ τ
¯λ+ τ − 2
]
, (A23)
¯λ := 1+ ω(1− τ ). (A24)
One can check that f (τ ¯λ−1)  0, and D1 > D2 for any
0  τ  1 and ω  1. Indeed, being both quantities τ and
ω positive, as well as ¯λ, we have
detH > 0 for any τ and ω. (A25)
We then proceed with the study of the second-order
derivative ∂2gR at the critical point P0. This is the first principal
minor of the Hessian matrix of Eq. (A19). It is easy to check
the following chain of inequalities:
∂2gR =
1
(τ + ¯λ)(ω2 − 1) +
f (ω−1)
4ω
+ (1− τ )
2
4τ ¯λ
f (τ ¯λ−1)
>
1
(τ + ¯λ)(ω2 − 1) +
f (ω−1)
4ω
>
1
(τ + ¯λ)(ω2 − 1) > 0, ∀ω > 1 and 0  τ  1.
(A26)
Therefore, the extremal point P0 is an absolute
minimum for the key rate of the no-switching
protocol.
By contrast, we notice that the study described above is
only valid for the pairs (g, g′) for which it is possible to define
the derivatives, i.e., those lying within the domain bounded by
the constraints of Eq. (5). In order to complete our analysis
we check that also the points at the boundary of the domain,
described by Eq. (5), give a key rate which is larger than that
one obtained for g = g′ = 0. We have studied numerically
these cases, computing the rate for the pairs (g,g′) fulfilling
the condition ω|g + g′| = ω2 + gg′ − 1. In Fig. 2 we show
an example of this computation, corresponding to the case
of a transmissivity τ ≃ 0.44 and thermal noise ω = 1.3, in
shot-noise unit (SNU). We see that the rate for single-mode
collective attack (red spot) lies well below the blue points,
which describe the key rate for the boundary two-mode attacks.
The colored region gives the values of the key rate for any
nonzero correlations g,g′.
Clearly, similar results are obtained for any other value
of 0  τ  1 and ω  1, with the area describing two-mode
attacks vanishing into a point as ω→ 1. In that case, the only
possible attack is single mode and, according to Eq. (5), we
have g,g′ → 0.
APPENDIX B: SWITCHING PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the key rate and its critical point
for the switching protocol. We arrive at the same conclusion
obtained for the no-switching protocol. In this case Bob
performs homodyne detections on the received signals modes,
by randomly switching the quadratures measured. Within
each block cj , Bob can decide to apply the same homodyne
detection on both modes B,B ′, or measure on two distinct
bases (qˆ and pˆ). Here we assume the former case. When Bob
detects both his modes in quadrature qˆ, we have
VqC = μI−
τ (μ2 − 1)
˜
[g2(1− τ )2 − ˜
2]
×
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2g2(1− τ )2 − ˜
2 g(1− τ ) ˜

1
g(1− τ ) ˜
 ˜
2
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠,
(B1)
052310-6
GAUSSIAN TWO-MODE ATTACKS IN ONE-WAY QUANTUM . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 95, 052310 (2017)
where ˜
 = τμ+ (1− τ )ω = 
− τ . When Bob detects both
his modes in quadrature pˆ, we obtain
VpC = μI−
τ (μ2 − 1)
˜
[g′2(1− τ )2 − ˜
2]
×
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
2g′2(1− τ )2 − ˜
2 g′(1− τ ) ˜

1
g′(1− τ ) ˜
 ˜
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
(B2)
In the first case (qˆ detection), for large μ, we obtain the
following symplectic spectrum
ν˜± =
√
(1− τ )(ω ± g)μ
τ
, (B3)
which depends on the correlation parameter g. In the second
case (pˆ detection), we have the following symplectic eigen-
values:
ν˜ ′± =
√
(1− τ )(ω ± g′)μ
τ
, (B4)
depending on correlation parameter g′. From Eqs. (B3) and
(B4), we compute two distinct conditional von Neumann
entropies,
SE|βqβ ′q = h(ν˜+)+ h(ν˜−)
μ→∞= log2
e2
4
1− τ
τ
√
(ω + g)(ω − g)μ
(B5)
and
SE|βpβ ′p = h(ν˜ ′+)+ h(ν˜ ′−)
μ→∞= log2
e2
4
1− τ
τ
√
(ω + g′)(ω − g′)μ.
(B6)
To the conditional von Neumann entropy, we average over
these two cases, getting the expression
SE|ββ ′ =
SE|βqβ ′q + SE|βpβ ′p
2
= log2
e2
4
1− τ
τ
√
ν−ν+μ. (B7)
1. Key rate for the switching protocol
Using the total von Neumann entropy of Eq. (22), the
conditional entropy of Eq. (B7), and the asymptotic expression
of the mutual information for the switching protocol,
IAB → 2 log2
τμ
τ + (1− τ )ω, (B8)
we compute the following expression of the key rate against
Gaussian two-mode coherent attacks:
˜R = 1
2
log2
√
ν−ν+
(1− τ )[τ + (1− τ )ω] −
h(ν+)+ h(ν−)
2
,
(B9)
from which we can recover the standard case of single-mode
collective attack setting g = g′ = 0.
For the sake of completeness, here we also discuss the case
where Bob applies different homodyne detections (one in qˆ,
the other in pˆ), within each two-mode block. In this case one
finds a lower key rate because measurements have the effect
of decorrelating modes B and B ′. As a result, any dependency
on g, g′ is canceled from the conditional CM, and for μ≫ 1
one finds the following doubly degenerate eigenvalues:
ν˜1,2 =
√
(1− τ )ωμ
τ
. (B10)
After some algebra we obtain the following nonoptimal key
rate
¯R = 1
2
log2
ω
(1− τ )[τ + (1− τ )ω] −
h(ν+)+ h(ν−)
2
,
(B11)
which is not interesting from a practical point of view, because
the parties can always choose to group instances of the protocol
with the same quadrature homodyned.
2. Study of the critical point for the switching protocol
We then compute the first derivatives of the rate in Eq. (B9),
with respect to the correlations parameters g and g′, obtaining
the following:
∂g ˜R =
ζ
4
[
f (ν−1− )+
g
(ω + g)ν−
− ν+ν−f (ν
−1
+ )
(ω + g)(ω − g′)
]
,
(B12)
∂g′ ˜R =
ζ ′
4
[
f (ν−1− )+
g′
(ω + g′)ν−
− ν+ν−f (ν
−1
+ )
(ω + g′)(ω − g)
]
,
(B13)
where the function f (.) has been defined in Eq. (A21), and the
symplectic eigenvalues ν± are given in Eqs. (A8) and (A9),
while we defined ζ and ζ ′ as follows:
ζ := ν−
2(ω − g′) , ζ
′ := ν−
2(ω − g) . (B14)
Note that these derivatives are properly defined within the
constraints of Eq. (5) that identify a sector of the (g,g′) plane
for which the conditions ν− > 1 and ν+ > 1 must hold. In fact,
the situation for which one has ν± = 1 can only be obtained
in P0, i.e., if the attack is collective. Solving the system of
equations∇R = 0 one finds that P0 is a critical point, and that
it is also unique for any ω  1 and g and g′ fulfilling Eq. (5).
3. Positive definiteness of the Hessian matrix
The second-order derivatives with respect to g, evaluated
in P0, is given by
∂2g
˜R = − ω
2 + g2
4(ω2 − g2)2 +
1
8
[
κ+
ν2+ − 1
− κ−
ν2− − 1
]
+ 1
8
[√
κ+f (ν−1+ )
ω + g −
√
κ−f (ν−1− )
ω − g
]
, (B15)
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with the coefficients κ± defined as follows:
κ+ :=
ω + g′
ω + g , κ− :=
ω − g′
ω − g . (B16)
The derivative with respect to g′ and the mixed derivatives are
given by the expressions
∂2g′
˜R = − ω
2 + g′2
4(ω2 − g′2)2 +
1
8
[
κ−1+
ν2+ − 1
− κ
−1
−
ν2− − 1
]
+ 1
8
[
f (ν−1+ )√
κ+(ω + g′)
− f (ν
−1
− )√
κ−(ω − g′)
]
, (B17)
∂2g,g′
˜R = ∂2g′,g ˜R
= 1
8
[
1
ν2+ − 1
− 1
ν2− − 1
+ f (ν
−1
+ )
ν+
− f (ν
−1
− )
ν−
]
,
(B18)
which, evaluated in P0, give
∂2g
˜R = ∂2g′ ˜R =
1
4
(
1
ω2(ω2 − 1) + ω
−1f (ω−1)
)
, (B19)
∂2g,g′
˜R = ∂2g′,g ˜R =
1
4
(
1
ω2 − 1 − ω
−1f (ω−1)
)
. (B20)
We then compute the determinant of the Hessian in P0,
obtaining the following expression:
detH = ∂2g ˜R × ∂2g′ ˜R −
(
∂2g,g′
˜R
)2
= (ω
2 + 1)(2ωf (ω−1)− 1)
16ω4(ω2 − 1) , (B21)
which is always positive because
f (ω−1) > 1
ω
for ω  1. (B22)
We have also checked that detH > 0 in the limit of ω→ 1+.
Finally, we have verified that the second-order derivative of
Eq. (B19) is positive in P0. In fact, for ω > 1, one always has
1
4
(
1
ω2(ω2 − 1) + ω
−1f (ω−1)
)
> 0. (B23)
Therefore, P0 is a point of absolute minimum for the key rate
of Eq. (B9), so that Eq. (29) is also verified for the switching
protocol.
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